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1. Introduction
e aim of this paper is to analyze how Hermann von Helmholtz under-
stands the relation between the physical world and sensations. As a com-
mitted empiricist, he maintains that sensations are signs (symbols) that ex-
ternal causes impress onperceivers’ sense organs, that those signs are used by
themind to achieve knowledge of the world, and that all human knowledge
starts from sensations. His work is devoted, among other things, to nding
out suitable justication for the reliability of human knowledge, to explain-
ing how human beings can make use of qualitative sensations in order to
achieve knowledge of the physical world, and to nding out a satisfactory
theory of the causal relations between the external reality and the perceptual
one. Helmholtz plays an important role in the birth of physical physiology
in the XIXth century.e next section of this article deals with Helmholtz’s
understanding of the law of specic nerve energies, which was developed
by Johannes Müller, his supervisor and mentor. e law of specic nerve
energies states that sensations’ qualitative character emerge from nerves’ re-
sponses to external stimuli. Starting from Müller’s work, Helmholtz tackles
the problem of the relation between qualitative sensations and physiologi-
cal events. e empiricist tradition rejects the idea according to which sen-
sations resemble the physical world, and tries investigating that relation in
causal terms. However, this strategy is not as straightforward as it appears.
Emile Du Bois-Reymond, Helmholtz’s friend and collegue, points out not
only that we do not know why and how physical and physiological events
give raise to qualitative sensations, but also that we will never knowwhy and
how that happens. Du Bois-Reymond’s thesis will be studied in the third
section of this article. e fourth part deals with Helmholtz’s attempts to
overcome the inadequacies in our understanding of the relation between
the mental and the physical. His doctrine of unconscious inferences, his
so-called experimental intercationism, and, especially, his revision of the
Humean and theKantian notions of causalitywill take the center of the stage.
I analyze those theories in order to show that Helmholtz is well aware of the
diculties intrinsic to his own solutions. As we will see, his main goal is
to give reasons for believing that the relation between the physical world
and the perceptual one is lawful. Without a satisfactory understanding of
that relation, even the commonsense theses that a mind-independent world
exists and that our knowledge of it is reliable get in trouble. Indeed, if all
knowledge starts from sensations, it is not easy to see how human beings
can know that the world exists when nobody is perceiving it. Moreover, if
we do not properly understand how our sensations present the physical re-
ality, someone could cast doubts on the reliability of our knowledge of the
world.
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2. Some troubles with the law of specic nerve energies
Given the centrality of the notion of sensation in Helmholtz’s work, it is ap-
propriate to provide his denition of the term. He states that
our sensations are only eects which are produced by external agents
upon our sense organs, and theway inwhich such eect ismanifested,
of course, depends essentially on the nature of the apparatus which is
aected. As far as the quality of our perception gives us information
about the characteristic nature of the external source of stimulation, it
can be regarded as a symbol, but not as an image if this source. For an
image some kind of identity with the portrayed object is demanded
[. . . ]. A symbol however does not have to possess any kind of simi-
larity with the object which it represents. (Helmholtz 1878, 212)
As a committed empiricist, he claims that only one thing cannot bemod-
ied by experience: the qualitative response of sensory nerves to external
stimulations (Helmholtz 1866, 182). Each sense organ responds in a pecu-
liar manner when stimulated: the eyes perceive colours, the ears sounds, the
nose odours, and so on. Sense organs’ response is ruled by the law of specic
nerve energies, whichwas established byMüller, andwhich is acknowledged
as the starting point of contemporary physiology. Its main point is that we
can be aware only of our nerves’ responses and not of the world itself.1 Ac-
1 Given the importance of the law of specic nerve energy for our discussion, it is advanta-
geous to report Müller’s ten “axioms” almost in their entirety.e following version of the
axioms is fromKeeley (2009): 1. Itmust be kept inmind that external agencies can give rise
to no kind of sensation which cannot also be produced by internal causes exciting changes
in the condition of our nerves; 2. e same internal cause excites in the dierent senses
dierent sensations—in each sense the sensations peculiar to it; 3.e same external cause
also gives rise to dierent sensations in each sense, according to the special endowments
of its nerve; 4.e peculiar sensations of each nerve of sense can be excited by several dis-
tinct causes internal and external; 5. Sensation consists in the sensorium receiving through
the medium of the nerves, and as the result of the action of an external cause, a knowledge
of certain qualities or conditions, not of external bodies, but of the nerves of the sense
themselves; and these qualities of the nerves of sense are in all dierent, the nerve of each
sense having its own peculiar quality or energy; 6. e nerve of each sense seems to be
capable of one determinate kind of sensation only, and not of those proper to the other
organs of sense [. . . ]; 7. It is not known whether the essential cause of the peculiar “energy”
of each nerve of sense is seated in the nerve itself, or in the parts of the brain and spinal
cord with which it is connected; but it is certain that the central portions of the nerves
included in the encephalon are susceptible of their peculiar sensations, independently of
more peripheral portion of the nervous cords which form the means of communication
with the external sense organ; 8. e immediate objects of the perception of our senses
are merely the peculiar states induced in the nerves, and felt as sensations either by the
nerves themselves or by the sensorium; but inasmuch as the nerves of the senses are mate-
rial bodies, and therefore participate in the properties ofmatter generally occupying space,
being susceptible of vibratory motion, and capable of being changed chemically as well as
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cording toMüller, sensations are, one the one hand, nervous and physiolog-
ical responses to physical stimuli; on the other hand, they have a qualitative
character.erefore, one of his main goals consists in individuating how the
correspondence between external stimuli and qualitative sensations works.
Helmholtz adds a further distinction to Müller’s theory:
Among the sensory perceptions there are two dierent distinguish-
able classes. e profoundest dierence is the one between percep-
tions belonging to dierent senses, such as betweenblue, sweet, warm,
and the pitch of tones. I have taken the liberty of calling this dier-
ence a dierence in themodality of perception. [. . . ]e second kind
of dierence, however, the less decisive one, is the one between dif-
ferent perception of the same sense. I reserve for it the designation of
dierence of quality. (Helmholtz 1878, 210)
Helmholtz expands Müller’s law in order to let the dierences between
the operations of the various sensory modalities emerge. For example, hu-
man sight is dened by only three specic nerve energies, the ones associated
with the three types of cones in the retina; by contrast, Helmholtz counts
thirty-two hundred auditory energies, because of the particular structure of
the cochlea and of the inner ear. While the eye “synthetizes” all colors start-
ing from the three primary hues, the ear “analyzes” complex sound waves in
conformity with Ohm’s law.2
e main point of Helmholtz’s philosophy of sensation is that the ve
sensory systems supply symbols of the external reality which can be used by
the mind to represent the world. However, the fact that sensations depend
more on the responses of the nerves than on their external causes threatens
the reliability and faithfulness of perceptual representations. Helmholtz has
to explain not only the dierences between the responses of the various sense
organs, but also the dissimilarities between the responses of sensory nerves
on the one hand, and the responses of other kinds of nerves on the other
hand. About this last problem, he reports an intriguing experiment:
e French physiologists Philippeau and Vulpain, aer dividing the
motor and sensitive nerves of the tongue, succeeded in getting the up-
per half of the sensitive nerve to unite with the lower half of themotor.
by the action of heat and electricity, they make known to the sensorium, by virtue of the
changes thus produced in them by external causes, not merely their own condition, but
also properties and changes of conditions of external bodies [...]; 9.at sensations are re-
ferred from their proper seat towards the exterior, is owing, not to anything in the nature
of the nerves themselves, but to the accompanying idea derived from experience; 10. e
mind not only perceives the sensations and interprets them according to ideas previously
obtained, but it has a direct inuence upon them.
2 On Ohm’s law, see (Helmholtz 1863/1877, 393).
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Aer the wound had healed, they found that irritation of the upper
half, which in normal conditions would have been felt as a sensation,
now excited the motor branches below, and thus caused the muscles
of the tongue to move. We conclude from these facts that all the dif-
ference which is seen in excitation of dierent nerves depends only
upon the dierence of the organs to which the nerve is united and to
which it transmits the state of excitation. (Helmholtz 1867, 83)
In Helmholtz’s view, sensory systems provide symbols (sensations) of
the external reality which can be used for building mental representations
of the world. However, given his endorsement of the law of specic nerve
energies, and given Philippeau and Vulpain’s experiment, he has to explain
how faithful representations of the reality are obtainable. Helmholtz writes:
All that we apprehend of the external world is brought to our con-
sciousness by means of certain changes which are produced in our
organs of sense by external impressions, and transmitted to the brain
by the nerves. It is in the brain that these impressions rst become
conscious sensations, and are combined so as to produce our concep-
tions of the surrounding objects. If the nerves which convey these
impressions are cut through, the sensation, and the perception of the
impression, immediately cease. (Helmholtz 1867, 82)
Two metaphysical and epistemological problems stem from the quoted
passage. Firstly: if, as empiricists like Helmholtz maintain, sensations are
the source of all our knowledge, how are we allowed to state that the reality
exists even when our nerves are cut through and sensations of that reality
are lacking? Secondly: how sensible qualities as, for example, colours and
odours emerge from electric discharges in the brain? What is the relation or
the correspondence between the two?
It is now appropriate to examine the second problem. For instance, from
a physical point of view, rays of light and rays of heat are both describable as
electromagnetic oscillations: however, from a qualitative point of view, sen-
sations of light are quite dierent from sensations of heat. Another example:
if acoustic waves reach the skin in place of the ear, theymay cause tactile sen-
sations, not auditory sensations. Moreover, the same type of sensation can
emerge from dierent physical stimuli: for instance, when the optic nerve
is aected by electromagnetic, mechanical or electric stimuli, we experience
sensations of light. A further example: in the metamerism case, “for any
given object, of any given SSR [surface spectral reectance], there will be an
indenite number of other objects with dierent SSR that nevertheless tend
to look the same in a broad range of conditions” (Noë 2004, 151). All these
facts show that it is compulsory to face a demanding question: how can we
trust sensory symbols that transcribe dierent causes in the same way, and
identical causes in dierent ways?
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e break between physical causes and physiological responses can be
expressed using the classic distinction between primary and secondary qual-
ities. Gary Hateld, whose works on Helmholtz are of remarkable impor-
tance, writes about this point:
In conformity with the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities, it was widely held that color sensations are mere signs of
their causes and that there is no intrinsic connection between the
phenomenal character of color sensation and its external cause. Na-
tivists and empirists alike maintained that the phenomenal character
of color sensations depends on some currently inexplicable property
of the nervous system (a position that was formalized in the doctrine
of specic nerve energies). (Hateld 1990, 191)
To sum up. Helmholtz has to deal with the problem of nding a lawlike
relation between physical causes and sensible eects. Moreover, he needs
to nd a way to emerge from the world of sensations in order to obtain a
reliable knowledge of the external reality. In other words, Helmholtz needs
to nd a way to bridge the gap between the physiological and the mental.
3. Du Bois-Reymond and the impossibility of nding a sucient
reason to explain the qualitative character of sensations
Given the signicance of the subject, it is necessary to investigate whether
the diculty of dening the nature of sensations, which swings between
a phenomenological dimension and a physiological dimension, is contin-
gent, empirical, and manageable with a deeper scientic understanding, or
whether this diculty is a matter of principle. In order to address this ques-
tion, I refer to two presentations given in 1872 and in 1880 by Emile Du Bois-
Reymond,3 who is a friend of Helmholtz, and who was one of the founders
of contemporary physical physiology together with him, Ernst Brücke, and
Carl Ludwig. e two speeches deal with the limits of human understand-
ing; one of those limits concerns the grasping of what sensations are and of
their causal origins. Du Bois-Reymond starts his analysis from the mecha-
nistic point of view and from the Laplace’s demon hypothesis.us, he tries
imagining a huge system of simultaneous dierential equations from which
it would be possible to deduce the origin, the direction of movement, and
the velocity of every atom of the universe. It is interesting to pose a question:
on the assumption that we obtained such a cosmic formula, would we be
able to explain how sensations and sensible qualities emerge from nervous
actions and physical stimulations? Du Bois-Reymond’s answer is negative:
3 e rst speechwas given to the Congress of German Scientists and Physicians, the second
to the Prussian Academy of Sciences.
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the origin of sensation is one of the problems that transcend human under-
standing, along with the essence of matter and forces and with the origin of
movement.
Du Bois-Reymond’s negative position is maintained not only because
of empirical reasons, but as a matter of principle. It is appropriate to note
that the inexplicability of the origins of sensations would emerge even if we
could grasp the essences of matter and forces. Even if the Laplace’s demon
knew these essences (that seems to be, according to Du Bois-Reymond, a
logical impossibility), he would be unable to explain how sensible qualities
emerge from material structures. If this is correct, it seems not to be the
case that the external reality is made with the sensible qualities that human
beings perceive “in it”: without nerve transductions, ruled by Müller’s law,
the coloured and noisy world in which we live would be obscure and silent
(Du Bois-Reymond 1872, 22–23).e consequences for the notion of sensa-
tion are signicant. If the world is obscure and silent, how can we maintain
that sensations are symbols of this world? In order to claim the existence of
a symbolic relation, it is necessary to discover at least a constant correspon-
dence between the cause of the symbol and its eect.
ose troubles are known at least since Locke’s works (?). Indeed, one
of the distinctive characteristic of modern empiricism is the rejection of the
notions of resemblance and of pre-established harmony between sensations
and the physical world. Helmholtz takes this approach seriously, and gets rid
of any resemblance between sensations andphysical causes.4 For this reason,
he has to nd an alternative explanatory paradigm. However, according to
Du Bois-Reymond, that paradigm does not exist.
Du Bois-Reymond, in order to make bright his thesis about the tran-
scendence of any explanation of the nature of sensations, proposes to med-
itate on some imaginary cases. In one mental experiment, borrowed from
Leibniz, he asks to envisage a big machinery able to think, sense and per-
ceive (Du Bois-Reymond 1880, 63–64). is machinery is supposed to be
4 As a reviewer points out, the notion of “resemblance between sensations and the physical
world” should be understood from a third-person perspective. Probably, this is one of the
main reasons why the empiricist tradition, starting from Locke, takes advantage of phys-
iological and psychological researches on perception. In the end, the empiricist tradition
rejects the notion of resemblance, because it does not allow to explain why sensations and
perceptions resemble the world in the rst place. However, Helmholtz, during the second
part of his career, endorses a temporal version of the notion of resemblance, according to
which the same object in similar circumstances gives rise to the same sign (sensation).is
theory is developed byHelmholtz in order to explain the lawlike relation between the phys-
ical and the mental. Unfortunately, it is not the aim of this paper to elucidate this point,
which deserves an appropriate and dedicated space of discussion. However, Helmholtz’s
temporal analysis of the concept of resemblance is closely related to his analysis of the
concept of causality, which I deal with in the fourth section of this article.
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enlarged as if it were a mill, so that it would be possible for us to go inside
it. According to Du Bois-Reymond, in this hypothetical situation we would
nd only mechanical collisions, but nothing suitable to explain the qualita-
tive character of sensations. DuBois-Reymond deduces a strong conclusion:
the psychic processes, and rst of all sensations, that take place in our brains
lack any sucient reason (Du Bois-Reymond 1872, 39).
Du Bois-Reymond is not a weird idealist philosopher; rather, he is sym-
pathetic with materialist thinkers as, for examples, Pierre Cabanis and Carl
Vogt (Du Bois-Reymond 1872, 45–46). According to them, every faculty of
the soul is a function of the brain, and there is a strict similarity between
sensations and thoughts on the one hand and secretions like bile on the
other: they are all objects of (neuro)physiological enquiry. However, Du
Bois-Reymond claims that while it is possible, at least in principle, to gain
knowledge of the material processes that underlie bodily secretions, the ori-
gins of sensations and thoughts are not comprehensible using only neuro-
physiological tools.
e state of aairs seems troublesome. According to the empiricist world
view (endorsed by and large by both Helmholtz and Du Bois-Reymond),
sensations are the source of all human knowledge; however, the best sci-
entic model at that time available cannot provide explanations of them.
Moreover, there are reasons to think that this is true also for contemporary
scientic theories. As Nadia Moro (2015) points out,5 even if we precisely
knew the nature of the stimuli, the anatomy of our sensory systems and their
physiology, it would be impossible to determine on those bases the qualita-
tive character of the corresponding sensations. Albeit physiological, psycho-
logical and neuroscientic theories are alwaysmore rened, the gap between
physical stimuli, neurophysiological interactions, and qualitative sensations
is like a blank space not yet lled up. Furthermore, sensations are claimed
to be signs of causes with which they have no necessary connection: in fact,
it is possible that the very same stimulus cause dierent sensations, and that
dierent stimuli cause the very same sensation. To the question of whether
we could gain knowledge of the origins of sensations, Du Bois-Reymond an-
swers: not only “Ignoramus” (we ignore), but “Ignorabimus” (wewill ignore)
(Du Bois-Reymond 1872, 47).
4. A sentimental-transcendental notion of causality
Helmholtz is well aware of the concerns expressed by his colleague. In or-
der to overcome those troubles, he tries developing some solutions, among
5 Among other topics,Moro’s work deal withKantian and post-Kantian philosophy andwith
XIXth century philosophical psychology and physiology.
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which the psychological theory of unconscious inferences, what has been
called “experimental interactionism,” and a reformulation of the notion of
causality. In what follows, I analyze those proposals.
e theory of unconscious inferences is coherent with the denition of
sensation given above, which states that sensations are symbols that themind
uses in order to know the external world. e metaphysical and epistemo-
logical aims of this theory are clearly stated in the following passage: “It is
obvious that we can never emerge from the world of our sensations to the
apperceptions of an external world, except by inferring from the changing
sensation that external objects are the causes of this changes” (Helmholtz
1866, 200). In addition, unconscious inferences are employed by Helmholtz
to compose a unied picture of the mental life. Hateld writes:
Helmholtz regarded the dissolution of the sensibility-understanding
distinction as one of the chief advantages of his theory of unconscious
inference, equivalent to breaking down the distinction between Ken-
nen andWissen, that is, between phenomenal acquaintance with ob-
jects as opposed to propositional knowledge.e solvent performing
these reductions was the notion that underlying the supposedly dis-
tinct operations that results in sensory perception on the one hand
and judgments on the other is one kind of psychological operation—
the association of ideas. (Hateld 1990, 204)
e theory of unconscious inferences is one of Helmholtz’s main contri-
butions to the history of psychology. However, he sees that this theory does
not provide sucient tools to emerge from theworld of sensible appearances
and to reach the external world. Indeed, as the contemporary philosopher
Michael Heidelberger underlines, Helmholtz’s approach seems too close to
the idealistic worldview:
In conceiving of external perception as perception of one’s own in-
ner state (of nervous excitation conducted to the brain) Helmholtz,
no matter how much he denied it, remained an idealist. For, as Kant
noted, it is the mark of idealism to believe that the sole immediate ex-
perience is the inner one fromwhich one only infers external objects.
(Heidelberger 1994, 439)
Moreover, experience alone seems not to provide a constant criterion
that associative processes can make use of to actively arrange simple sensa-
tions in complex perceptions, nor it seems to provide stable grounds for the
generalizations required to form the major premises of the syllogistic-like
unconscious reasonings.
Helmholtz sees those problems, and looks for suitable solutions. One of
his main goals is to hold realism and empiricism together. A way he tests in
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order to achieve this goal is the so-called “experimental interactionism.” Ac-
cording to Helmholtz, sensible impressions constitute a symbolic language
that gives information about the external world. Human beings have to learn
how to exploit this symbolic system, and this can happen only if they learn to
distinguish the changes due to their voluntary and active movements from
the changes independent of them:
e meaning we assign to our sensations depends upon experiment,
and not upon mere observation of what takes place around us. We
learn by experiment that the correspondence between two processes
takes place at any moment that we choose, and under conditions that
we can alter as we choose. Mere observation would not give us the
same certainty, even though oen repeated under dierent condi-
tions. (Helmholtz 1867, 128)
Helmholtz’s idea is to study the correspondence between the physical
reality and sensations as long as it is mirrored in experience and in per-
ceivers’ active engagement in the world. Experimental interactionism has
at least three benets that he can takes advantage of. First, it allows to un-
derline the role of experience and practical experiments, thus strengthening
Helmholtz’s empiricist framework. Second, the possibility of constantly ver-
ifying the continuous existence of the reality seems to back up Helmholtz’s
realist inclination. ird, the rst two advantages could cloud the diculty
of explaining the physiological relations between nerve bers and sensa-
tions, between brains and minds. However, the possibility of performing
experiments with our bodies is not sucient to obtain an empirical crite-
rion to organize sensations. Hateld explains:
e “feeling” associated with muscles movement is just one more ele-
ment that enters into the mix of non-spatial sensations, out of which
rules of spatial localization emerge. If the empiristic account is carried
through consistently, it precludes the kind of innate “meaning” that
would be presupposed in an active testing of spatial relations through
voluntary motions that carry as part of their content an explication
of a particular change, or any change at all, in the pattern of sensa-
tion.e initial help that was promised from the metaphor of “active
testing” can be secured only by a violation of the project of resolving
thought into associative learning. (Hateld 1990, 207)
Helmholtz’s psychological works aim to a unitary picture of mind. Art,
scientic knowledge and perception are all ways to nd universal lawful-
ness and invariants in natural phenomena. e problem is that laws of as-
sociations, unconscious inferences and experimental interactionism are not
enough to achieve this goal, because they only deal with particular and em-
pirical perceptions. erefore, Helmholtz tries nding out if it is possible
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to take advantage of some version of the law of causality in order to con-
ceptualize the alleged lawfulness of nature and of perceptual processes. In
particular, he works on the Kantian version of it. However, given that his
empiricist attitude prevent him from using, in scientic explanations, any
kind of pre-established harmony between mind and nature, and given that
he maintains that sensations are symbols, not images, of the external world,
it follows that he struggles with fully endorsing a transcendental and a pri-
ori notion of causality, because it seems too close to themodus explicandi of
nativism and pre-established harmony. Albeit he is sometimes guilty of an
unfortunate confusion between nativism and Kantian transcendental phi-
losophy, he does not lack a deep understanding of what “a priori causality”
means. His resistance to that notion depends on contemplated reasons.
Helmholtz states that human minds can understand only those natu-
ral phenomena which are ordered in a lawful way. Together with this Kan-
tian principle, he supports the Humean idea according to which there is no
empirical evidence for empirical causes. It is necessary to investigate how
Helmholtz tries conciliating these two approaches. Until now, two kinds of
empirical regularity have been identied: the regularity due to the actions of
external objects, and the regularity due to the experiments performed with
our own bodies. Given that, according to the law of specic nerve energies,
what is immediately perceived is the physiological response of the nerves
and not the physical stimuli, the best way to recover the external reality is,
according to Helmholtz, to carry out inferences starting from the double
regularity just mentioned. However, this paradigm needs a well-rened ex-
planation of what causation is. is, for a number of reasons: 1) Qualita-
tive sensations are, according to Helmholtz, the outcome of processes that
involve physical, physiological, and psychological events; it is necessary to
take into account all of them; 2) Helmholtz has to deal with the transcendent
diculty of bridging the gap between nervous actions and sensible qualities;
3) He has to face the charge of psychologism, that is, the charge according
to which he has investigated only the empirical side, but not the properly
epistemological side, of the process of knowledge.
Helmholtz is well aware of what is at stake in his attempt to adjust his
theory of sensation and in his attempt to reconcile realism with empiricism.
During his early career, he maintains a both mentalistic and scientic realist
view: in his rst work on Goethe (Helmholtz 1853), he states that, given that
it is impossible to perceive forces and causes and that we perceive only their
eects, we have to depart from the sensible world in order to explain natural
phenomena. us, physics is supposed to discover the concealed mecha-
nisms which work behind the perceivable scene. However, such a position
is described, in other works, as the Icarus’ ight of metaphysical reasoning
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(Helmholtz 1877, 548). According to the committed empiricist Helmholtz,
the senses are unavoidable means by which gure out what happens in the
world: naïve mentalism and naïve physicalism are not compatible with this
framework. In the end, Helmholtz acknowledges the point and chooses the
empiricist side.
However, he is also aware of the limits inherent to empiricism, in partic-
ular with regard to the notion of causation, which is obviously fundamental
to the denition of sensations as signs. From the second half of the Sixties, he
triesmerging his empiricismwith the Kantian and transcendental paradigm
of causality. In order to understand properly this move, it is useful to pay at-
tention to Helmholtz’s own words. In some passages, he seems to endorse a
transcendental notion of causality:
e law of causation, by virtue of which we infer the cause from the
eect, has to be considered also as being a law of our thinkingwhich is
prior to all experience. Generally, we can get no experience from nat-
ural objects unless the law of causation is already active in us. (Helm-
holtz 1866, 201)
If the law of causation is given a priori, then, by denition, experience
cannot provide evidence for it:
e causal law really is given a priori, it is a transcendental law. It
is impossible to prove it from experience. As we have seen, the rst
steps of experience are not possible without inductive conclusions,
i.e., without the Causal Law. Even if previous experience taught us
that everything observed thus far has taken place according to law—
which as yet we are not justied in asserting—it could only follow as
an inductive conclusion, i.e., the assumption that the Causal Lawmay
follow, that the Causal Lawwill be valid also in the future. (Helmholtz
1878, 228)
According to Helmholtz, the law of causality is a logical law (in the Kan-
tian sense). However, the fact that it cannot be proved by experience involves
some aer-eects. In the following two long passages, Helmholtz struggles
with giving the transcendental notion of causality a full endorsement. In the
rst, he writes:
e law of sucient basis amounts simply to the requirement ofwish-
ing to understand everything.e process of our comprehension with
respect to the natural phenomena is that we try to nd generic no-
tions and laws of nature. Laws of nature are merely generic notions for
the changes in nature. But since we have to assume the laws of na-
ture as being valid and as acting independently of our observations and
thinking, whereas as generic notions they would concern at rst only
the method of our thinking, we call them causes or forces. Hence,
Andrea Togni 95
whenwe cannot trace natural phenomena to a law, and therefore can-
not make the law objectively responsible as being the cause of the
phenomena, the very possibility of comprehending the phenomena
ceases. However, we must try to comprehend them.ere is no other
method of bringing them under the control of the intellect. And so in-
vestigating them must be proceed on the supposition that they are
comprehensible. Accordingly, the law of sucient reason is really
nothing more than the urge of our intellect to bring all our percep-
tions under its own control. It is not a law of nature. Our intellect
is the faculty of forming general conceptions. It has nothing to do
with our sense-perceptions and experiences, unless it is able to form
general conceptions or laws. ose laws are then objectied and des-
ignated as causes. But if it is found that the natural phenomena are
to be subsumed under a denite causal connection, this is certainly
and objectively valid fact, and corresponds to special objective rela-
tions between natural phenomena, which we express as being their
causal connection, simply because we do not know how else to express
it. (Helmholtz 1866, 202, italics added)
e transcendental law of sucient reason (that is, in this context, an-
other name for the Causal Law) is based on nothing more than the desire to
know everything. Natural phenomena’s conformity with causal laws cannot
be taken for granted; worse, it is not empirically demonstrable. Helmholtz’s
reference to transcendental causality seems more a last resort than a strong
justication for the reliability of human knowledge. In other words, it seems
a sentimental urge, the “urge of the intellect to bring all our perceptions un-
der its own control.”
A similar attitude is expressed in the following passage:
Every inductive conclusion is based on the condence that a regular
behavior hitherto observed will prove to be valid also in all cases not
yet observed.is is a trust in the lawfulness of all occurrences. And
conformity to law is the condition of intelligibility. Trust in the law-
fulness of nature is the same trust in the intelligibility of natural phe-
nomena. If we suppose however that the understanding will be com-
plete, then we will be able to establish one last nal cause for observed
changes. Our cognition is responsible for terming this rule principle,
e Causal Law. Wemay say that it expresses our trust in the complete
intelligibility of the world. Understanding, in the sense in which I have
described it, is the method by which our reasoning accepts the world,
arranges the facts, and predetermines the future. It is one’s right and
duty to extend the application of this method to all that takes place,
and it actually has yielded great returns in this manner. We have no
other guarantees however for the applicability of the causal law but its
success. (Helmholtz 1878, 228, italics added)
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e principle of causality seems grounded more in our trust and beliefs
than in transcendental objectivity. Indeed, Helmholtz provides no guaran-
tees of its validity but its (empirical) success. e law of sucient reason is
described by him as a sentimental urge to believe in (or to trust) the com-
plete intelligibility of the world. Desire, trust, belief, urge, assumption, sup-
position: Helmholtz’s notion of causality seems not to provide the desired
universal and necessary foundation of our knowledge of the external reality.
5. Summary and conclusion
In this article, I analyzed Helmholtz’s struggles with explaining why and
how the physical world causes the sensations we have when it impinges our
sense organs.e starting point was Müller’s law of specic nerve energies,
according to which what human beings perceive are the responses of their
nerves to the external stimuli andnot the external stimuli per se. Helmholtz’s
reections on this law, combined with his empiricist attitude, show his ur-
gency to justify the commonsense believes that the external world exists in-
dependently of the perceivers and that human perceptions and knowl-
edge of that world are trustworthy. e complexity of achieving this goal is
made explicit by Du Bois-Reymond’s claim that it is impossible to individu-
ate sucient reasons to explain how the physical world causes the emergence
of qualitative sensations.
Helmholtz’s doctrine of unconscious inferences does not provide the
tools to overcome those problems, mainly because it states that the world
is only indirectly grasped by human perceptions. His experimental inter-
actionism is not conclusive either, because it relies on merely empirical
grounds. Helmholtz, a committed empiricist, sees the diculties implied by
the empiricist paradigm, in particular with regard to the notion of causal-
ity. In fact, he states that physical stimuli, understood as the causal origins
of sensations, are unknowable in themselves, and that there is no empirical
evidence for the kind of causality from which sensations originate. is is
why Helmholtz turns his head towards Kant and his transcendental philos-
ophy: they promise a universal and necessary foundation for human knowl-
edge. In the end, in order to make sense of our insuppressible desire to gain
knowledge of the world, he endorses a sentimental-transcendental notion
of causality. However, the arguments he provides for this notion lie more in
the “trust in the complete intelligibility of the world,” or “in the urge of the
intellect to bring all our perceptions under its own control,” than in rational
reasoning.
If this is the case, skeptic philosophers that do not have faith in the com-
plete intelligibility of theworld canmake use of the very same argument pro-
vided by Helmholtz, just in the opposite direction. In order to avoid a non-
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fruitful impasse, it is necessary to ask why Helmholtz’s work leads toward
this unsatisfactory conclusion. My suspect is that the crucial diculty lies in
Helmholtz’s denition of sensations as signs of the external world.is def-
inition is so problematic that Helmholtz points out the urge to emerge from
the jail of sensations to recover the external reality that causes them. Aer
investigating a number of way outs, the most promising solution he nds to
reach the goal consists in empowering the intellect and in declaring his trust
in the lawfulness of the relations between the external world and perceivers.
However, Helmholtz would probably admit that this solution is not power-
ful enough for philosophers and scientists who do not share that trust.is
is hardly only Helmholtz’s problem: in contemporary philosophy and psy-
chology, the same need to escape from the jail of sensations is widespread.
Helmholtz has done much for our understanding of human sensations and
knowledge, especially because he pointed out the shortcomings that stem
from his own views. e moral of this article is that the philosophical and
the scientic communities should follow and go beyond Helmholtz work
in order to achieve a better understanding of what sensations are, of their
relation with the physical world, and of the knowledge that that relation is
supposed to make possible.
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